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THE ETHNIC IMPLICATIONS OF PREFERENTIAL VOTING 
John Coakley and Jon Fraenkel 
ABSTRACT. Around the turn of the century, political developments in Northern Ireland, 
Fiji and Papua New Guinea encouraged claims that preferential voting systems could 
steer polities in the direction of ‘moderate’ multi-ethnic government. Sixteen years later, 
we have a longer time period and larger volume of data to reassess these verdicts. This 
article investigates ballot transfer and party vote–seat share patterns in the seven deeply 
divided polities with some experience of preferential voting for legislative elections or 
direct presidential elections (Northern Ireland, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Estonia, Sri 
Lanka, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Southern Rhodesia). We find little support for 
centripetalist claims that such systems encourage ‘moderate’ parties. We argue that where 
district magnitude is low, where voters are required to rank preferences and where ticket 
voting prevails, departures from vote–seat proportionality may favour ‘moderate’ parties, 
but such heavily engineered systems may simply advantage the larger parties or yield 
erratic outcomes. 
At first sight, there is a seductive attraction to preferential voting as opposed to categorical 
party or candidate choice in divided societies. For many observers, the pursuit of the ‘middle 
ground’, promotion of ‘moderation’ and advocacy of ‘compromise’ are values to which 
priority should be given. If this is the case, electoral systems should at best promote support 
for parties of the centre, and at worst they should at least not hinder such support. This has 
implications for choice of electoral system. It has been strongly argued that systems based on 
categorical choice (such as the party list system or the plurality system) tend to encourage 
voters in divided societies to opt unambiguously for parties standing for the values of their 
ethnic groups. By contrast, preferential voting systems (such as the single transferable vote 
and the alternative vote) have been seen as permitting the expression of lower preference 
support outside ethnic communities, whether for parties of the centre or for parties associated 
with other communities, potentially encouraging alliances that might underpin formation of 
centrist governments. This approach has been recommended, with varying degrees of success, 
for South Africa, Bosnia, Fiji, Northern Ireland and Iraq. 
Empirical testing of the assumptions that underlie this approach to electoral mechanics has 
been frustrated by difficulties that commonly confront the researcher: limited data, and 
absence of a robust methodology. The richest data on preferential voting come from countries 
Ethnic implications of referential voting p. 2 
where ethnic divisions are not the primary influence on party cleavages—the Republic of 
Ireland, Malta and Australia. By contrast, even if they do use preferential voting, countries 
where electoral allegiances follow communal boundaries tend to enjoy less constitutional 
continuity, and to be prone to frequent change in electoral arrangements. 
We also need to consider methodological challenges in establishing causal links between the 
electoral system and voting patterns. Parties and candidates appealing across ethnic lines can 
be found in most democratic states, representing virtually all electoral systems, without the 
causal link to institutional design necessarily being decisive. In India and Indonesia, for 
example, centripetal pressures in party systems have been driven by factors quite unrelated to 
the choice of electoral system (Chandra, 2005; Mietzner, 2008). Conversely, it is often easy to 
exclude as legitimate test cases those where electoral outcomes are strongly polarized, for 
example because centripetal mechanisms are combined with consociational institutions in 
hybrid arrangements, or because minorities boycott elections, or because preferential voting is 
used at only one or two elections and a longer time-span is deemed necessary before firm 
conclusions can be drawn. Unfortunately, given the small number of relevant cases, such 
reasoning can be used to exclude all potentially relevant country cases. 
Although there exist many country-specific investigations of the working of preferential 
electoral systems, little research has been undertaken at the broader comparative level. One 
important exception is Benjamin Reilly’s study of electoral engineering in divided societies, 
which reported ‘clear evidence for centripetal outcomes … apparently in response to the 
incentives presented by the electoral system’ in Papua New Guinea (1964-72), Fiji (1999) and 
Northern Ireland (1998) (Reilly, 2001: 169). In these three cases, assessment of the 
preferential voting system merits some reconsideration in the light of developments since the 
turn of the century. In this article, we also examine the scantier evidence from four other cases 
(Sri Lanka, Southern Rhodesia, Estonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina), so as to offer a 
comprehensive assessment of the working of preferential voting systems in diverse societies.1 
THE WORLD OF PREFERENTIAL VOTING 
Before analyzing the real world cases, we need to examine three issues: the evolution of 
electoral systems, their mechanics, and the debate that surrounds their potential as conflict-
mediating devices. 
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The development of preferential voting 
We may envisage preferential voting as a response to some of the more obvious weaknesses 
of traditional categorical voting systems, under which ‘victors’ often fail to win a majority of 
votes. The first response, already widely in evidence in continental Europe in the nineteenth 
century, is the two-ballot system. This is designed to ensure that a winning candidate has an 
overall majority, and not merely a plurality, of votes cast in a single-member district. Two 
elections are held if necessary—an initial one to establish voters’ primary preferences, and a 
run-off ballot some time later in constituencies where no candidate has won an overall 
majority (50% or more of valid votes). The run-off is normally between the two candidates 
who head the poll in the first round. Where more candidates are allowed, a plurality may be 
sufficient for election in the second round. This system survives in French parliamentary 
elections, and is widely used for presidential elections around the world. 
Rather than bringing the voters back to the polling station on a second occasion, information 
can be collected as to how voters would cast a second ballot at the same time as they express 
their initial voting choice. In the supplementary or contingent vote system, any candidate who 
wins a majority of first votes is elected. If no candidate achieves a majority, all except the top 
two are eliminated, and lower preferences are used to redistribute ballots to the two front-
runners to determine the victor. This system is used for election of the Mayor of London and 
the President of Sri Lanka. 
In more sophisticated preferential voting systems, voters are permitted to rank all candidates. 
Here, several different counting systems are possible. In the Condorcet system, the winning 
candidate is the one who would be capable of defeating each of the other candidates in a two-
way contest, entailing an elaborate sequence of runoffs (a complication which explains why 
there is no contemporary example in a national-level political election). Alternatively, under 
the Borda system, points are attached to voter rankings of candidates, and the one with the 
highest score wins, a system used for two seats reserved for the Hungarian and Italian 
minorities in the Slovenian parliament (a modified version is used by the tiny Micronesian 
state of Nauru – see Fraenkel & Grofman, 2014). A simpler and more widely used ranking 
system is the alternative vote (AV or ‘instant runoff’) system. If no candidate wins a majority 
of first preferences votes, candidates are eliminated in inverse order and their lower 
preferences are redistributed among continuing candidates until one candidate reaches a 
majority. This system is used in elections to the Australian House of Representatives, for the 
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President of Ireland, and (since 2002) for legislative elections in Papua New Guinea. At 
subfederal level, it is used for lower house elections in New South Wales, Queensland, South 
Australia, Victoria and Western Australia.2 
The electoral systems so far discussed are not designed to achieve proportionality between 
party vote and seat shares. A straightforward adjustment converts the AV system into one that 
can attain a relatively high degree of proportionality. This is achieved by enlarging 
constituency size from single- to multi-member status, redefining the manner in which the 
quota for election is computed, and amending the rules for counting votes to take account not 
just of elimination of candidates but also distribution of the surplus votes arising when elected 
candidates exceed the quota. This is the single transferable vote (STV) system. The Droop 
quota, the number of valid votes divided by one more than the number of vacancies 
(truncated, and with the addition of one), defines the minimum number of votes necessary to 
secure election. Where no candidate reaches the quota at the first count, the lowest polling 
candidate is eliminated, and his or her votes are transferred in accordance with the next 
preferences marked on the ballot papers. Candidates who reach the quota are deemed elected, 
and any surplus votes over and above the quota are redistributed to other candidates in 
accordance with voter preferences. This process of recycling surpluses and eliminating lowest 
polling candidates is continued until all vacancies have been filled or until a further 
elimination or surplus distribution could not change the final result. 
In important respects, STV is the ‘British’ form of proportional representation, attractive to 
conservative theorists because it does not require (though it does permit) the formal 
recognition of political parties. It has been applied mainly in countries that have been under 
British influence, beginning with the colony of Tasmania at the end of the nineteenth century 
(for a summary, see Endersby and Towle, 2014: 145). At the level of the ‘first’ or ‘lower’ 
house of parliament of a sovereign state, the only two continuous examples of its use are the 
Republics of Ireland and Malta. Among second chambers, we may add the Australian Senate. 
Other examples exist mainly at subnational level—including the state legislature of Tasmania 
and the Australian Capital Territory; localities within the USA; elections at most levels in 
Northern Ireland; and local elections in Scotland and New Zealand. STV was used in a short-
lived experiment for elections to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia in 1990, but then abandoned. 
The STV system is also used in indirect elections—to the Irish senate, for example, and to the 
Indian second chamber, the Council of States (Rajya Sabha). 
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When we restrict the universe of cases to those that have used preferential voting (whether 
AV or STV) which are also deeply ethnically divided or highly ethnically diverse, we get a 
much smaller number of cases: for parliamentary elections, Northern Ireland and Estonia 
(STV), and Fiji, Southern Rhodesia and Papua New Guinea (AV); and for presidential 
elections, Sri Lanka and the (Bosnian) Republika Srpska (2000). We return to a discussion of 
these cases below. 
The mechanics of preferential voting 
Several features of ballot design have a considerable impact on voter behaviour in preferential 
voting systems, but three have particular importance for what may be called the ‘manipulative 
propensity’ of such systems. As Giovanni Sartori pointed out ‘from a manipulative point of 
view, electoral systems can be divided into strong and weak systems’. He found the ‘general 
rule’ to be that ‘the progression from maximal manipulative impact to sheer ineffectiveness 
follows, more than anything else, the size of the constituency’ (Sartori 1968: 278-9). With 
preferential voting systems, we can add two other influences. First, the ranking of candidates 
can be either optional or compulsory, and, where it is compulsory, the degree of compulsion 
can vary. While Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Australian Senate have compulsory ranking 
systems, countries using preferential voting in the northern hemisphere—including the 
Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Malta—all have optional ranking systems. If they 
choose to do so, voters can ‘plump’ only for a single candidate or allocate preferences only to 
candidates from a single party. Some advocates of preferential voting have favoured use of a 
compulsory ranking system because it can be used to require voters from one group to pass 
lower preferences to candidates or parties identified with the other group (Horowitz, 1991: 
190). 
Second, use of a ‘ticket’ voting system, whether under AV or STV, potentially grants political 
parties considerable control over preference transfers. In elections to the Australian Senate, in 
Fiji (1999-2006) and in New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia, a 
‘split format’ ballot paper is used, with a line separating two alternatives for voters.3 One part 
(usually the top part) refers to a preference order predetermined by parties; the other (below 
this) offers full choice to voters. Voters completing the ballot ‘above-the-line’ simply tick 
next to a party name. Such ballots, if transferred, are routed in accordance with party-
specified preference lists submitted for each constituency shortly before the election. Those 
completing the ballot paper ‘below-the-line’ order candidates numerically. This has a major 
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impact on the operation of preferential voting systems, and gives party officials a degree of 
power over ballot reallocations that would otherwise be absent, or reduced to the level of 
persuasion4. Some advocates of preferential voting have blamed use of ticket voting for 
difficulties experienced after the 1999 elections in Fiji (Reilly, 2001: 109-110). Certainly, 
ticket voting made it more likely that strategic considerations would influence the pattern of 
ballot transfers. 
<Insert Table 1 around here> 
Table 1 shows the cumulative impact of these mechanisms, running from those most open to 
manipulation (single-member districts, ticket voting permitted, mandatory ranking) to those 
least open (multi-member districts, no ticket voting, optional ranking). Electoral systems with 
a higher manipulability potentially allow outcomes that diverge from votes-seats 
proportionality, and in so doing they may encourage ‘moderates’; but they may simply assist 
larger or geographically concentrated parties. 
The debate on preferential voting in divided societies 
Among mid-20th century theorists of electoral system design, STV was commonly advocated 
as particularly appropriate for securing minority representation in divided societies 
(Mansergh, 1936: 126, 143-4; Mackenzie, 1954: 660; Lakeman, 1955: 128-131; Laponce, 
1957: 328). When a new wave of Western involvement in state-building and constitutional 
law arose in the 1990s and 2000s focussing on Bosnia and Iraq, STV once again found strong 
supporters. In addition to securing minority representation, STV is widely believed to 
strengthen the position of the political centre, and thus to contribute to a more ‘centripetal’ or 
‘accommodationist’ form of politics in divided societies (Reilly and Reynolds, 2000: 36; 
Reilly, 2001: 146-8; Reynolds et al., 2006: 76). 
Other theorists of constitutional design in divided societies have instead advocated AV rather 
than STV due to the higher threshold involved. Drawing on the Southern Rhodesian 
experience, Palley (1978: 16-17) concluded that the AV system had assisted a ‘moderate’ 
white settler party in its competition with a more conservative party. Claims that AV would 
give an advantage to the more moderate of two competing parties within the same ethnic 
group were more forcefully endorsed by Donald Horowitz. He argued that STV in Northern 
Ireland in the 1970s had used too low a quota to promote meaningful cross-ethnic vote-
pooling (Horowitz, 1991: 174; 2001: 93; 2002b: 213-4). By contrast, AV’s quota of 50%, he 
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suggested, would provide ‘a stronger dose of incentives for pooling votes’ (Horowitz, 1991: 
188-195; 173-4; 2001, 2002a). This argument has encouraged some support for AV in 
Northern Ireland (Wilford, 2010) and in Bosnia and Iraq (ICG, 1998; Belloni 2007; Wimmer, 
2003-4; Salamey & Pearson 2005). 
While there has been some disagreement over the relative merits of the STV and party list 
forms of proportional representation, it is the AV system that has aroused the most sustained 
controversy as a conflict-moderating device. Lijphart (1991) concluded that this system was 
‘not a realistic alternative’ for South Africa and other divided societies, a view echoed by 
McGarry and O’Leary (2006; 2009) as regards Northern Ireland. The most intense debate 
centred around the case of Fiji, where AV was introduced in 1997 with a view to moderating 
conflict between the indigenous Fijian and Indian populations. Horowitz, who had himself 
been influential in urging the adoption of this system, defended its capacity to secure cross-
ethnic electoral compromise as illustrated by the outcome of the general election of 1999 
(Horowitz, 2002a; 2004; 2006). This was, however, strongly disputed by other specialists in 
the area, who on theoretical grounds queried the capacity of AV to deliver ethnic peace, and 
used the 1999 and 2001 election results to offer empirical support for their argument 
(Fraenkel, 2001; Fraenkel and Grofman, 2004; 2006a; 2006b; 2007). In these debates, a 
central issue was whether—if the radical parties were sufficiently large—AV might generate 
a centrifugal anti-moderation impetus rather than a centripetal pro-centrist influence. 
For those sympathetic to the consociational approach (which seeks not to build up the 
political centre, but to recognise division and create overarching institutional structures to 
manage it), the list system of proportional representation has often been advocated, not only 
because it secures equitable representation of groups (particularly minorities) but also on the 
grounds that it reinforces the autonomy of political elites, thus freeing the party leadership to 
engage in power-sharing deals. STV, by contrast, ‘maximises the voter’s choice and 
consequently diminishes the power and flexibility of segmental leaders’ (Lijphart, 1977: 137). 
Other supporters of consociation have been more sympathetic to STV, advocating it as a 
moderating device while vigorously rejecting the centripetalist position (McGarry & O’Leary 
2006; 2009). 
The widely used plurality system has few supporters among specialists in electoral design for 
divided societies. Its advocates are usually driven by hostility to the alleged complexity and 
propensity for coalition government associated with proportional representation (Lardeyret, 
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1991; Barkan, 1995). Some believe that the plurality system encourages a two-party 
polarization around efforts to secure the support of the median voter and therefore discourages 
support for extremist parties. In the Northern Ireland context, AV has likewise been 
advocated because it will generate ‘multi-ethnic government without sacrificing the principle 
of majority rule’ (see Horowitz, 2002b: 194). Arend Lijphart, however, has argued that AV is 
no better than the plurality system in encouraging compromise: under the latter small parties 
stand aside to avoid splitting the vote, whereas under AV they transfer lower preferences to 
the larger parties (see Lijphart, 1991: 94). 
PREFERENTIAL VOTING IN ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 
The literature on electoral systems has for long recognised that the consequences of 
majoritarian and proportional systems in relatively homogeneous democracies are different 
from those in deeply divided societies. The early debates about the respective merits of AV 
and STV between Lijphart (1985, 1991) and Horowitz (1991) focused on issues of minority 
exclusion in South Africa (Reynolds, 1995) and Sri Lanka (Horowitz 1989). Subsequent 
debates have been about more evenly balanced bi-communal settings, such as Northern 
Ireland and Fiji, and about highly ethno-linguistically diverse settings, such as Papua New 
Guinea. 
<Insert Table 2 around here> 
Table 2 shows the range of divided polities that have used STV or AV for legislative elections 
at the national level (excluding coverage of presidential elections in Sri Lanka and Republika 
Srpska, for which seats and district magnitude would each be one). Northern Ireland offers by 
far the largest sample, with 870 seats contested over ten elections. Fiji’s 1999 and 2001 
elections indicate the potential for AV to deliver highly disproportionate results where the 
effective number of parties is close to three. When there were only two large parties (Fiji in 
2006, Southern Rhodesia in 1958-65), disproportionality under AV tended to be lower. Papua 
New Guinea’s 1964 and 1968 elections were contested without parties, and even thereafter a 
fluid party system survived, with many independents contesting elections, so that no 
meaningful vote-seat shares figure can be calculated. Similarly, the Estonian 2000 election 
was ‘extremely fluid’ with many ‘multiply endorsed candidates’ (Taagepera 1990: 307-8). Let 
us commence our analysis with Northern Ireland. 
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Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland (with a 2011 population of 1.8 million) became a self-governing part of the 
United Kingdom following the partition of Ireland in 1921. Like Fiji, it was marked by a 
bipolar form of politics, with a Protestant population of mainly Scottish and English origin 
(65% of the population, dropping to 48% by 2011) exercising political dominance over a 
Catholic population of mainly Gaelic Irish origin (35% of the population, rising to 45% by 
2011). 
Northern Ireland has used STV in three separate phases. In 1921, it was adopted for the 
Northern Ireland House of Commons, but in 1929 the Northern Ireland government 
reintroduced the plurality system. This had the effect of consolidating support around the two 
main parties, the Unionist Party representing the Protestant population and the Nationalist 
Party representing Catholics. Devolved institutions collapsed in 1972 following three years of 
civil unrest, and were replaced by direct rule from London. British government efforts to 
restore devolution were accompanied by the election of assemblies and a constitutional 
convention by STV at the height of the civil unrest in 1973, 1975 and 1982. The third phase 
followed the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which provided for a new assembly elected by 
STV, with a requirement that elected members self-designate as ‘nationalist’ or ‘unionist’ 
(though they could opt out, as ‘other’), a consociational device designed to facilitate group 
vetoes by the two ethnic blocs, and to ensure that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
would come from different blocs. The government was to be selected in exact proportion to 
party strength in the Assembly, using the d’Hondt formula. Elections to the new Assembly 
took place in 1998, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2016, but stable governments date only from 2007, 
following further refinement of the agreement. 
In the 1920s elections were highly polarized, with memories of armed conflict and the dispute 
around the partition of Ireland in 1921 still determining voting patterns. The centre, 
represented at that time by the Northern Ireland Labour Party, attracted both first preference 
votes and some transferred votes from either community, but there were almost no cross-
community transfers. A similar pattern was witnessed in 1973-82. By now, the Nationalist 
Party had been replaced by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and a divided 
Ulster Unionist Party was also threatened by the more militant Democratic Unionist Party. 
Analysis of the 1973 election suggested that contests tended to be within communal groups, 
with negligible inter-ethnic exchanges of lower preferences (Lawrence, Elliott and Laver, 
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1975: 72-9). Similar verdicts were reached as regards the 1975 elections (McAllister, 1975: 
17-20). This pattern was repeated in the election of 1982, with few transfers from the 
nationalist bloc to any unionist party, even fewer from the unionist bloc to any nationalist 
party, and the party of the centre, the cross-confessional Alliance Party, failing to make much 
headway (Elliott and Wilford, 1983: 56)5. 
STV may have induced some moderation in party strategy, even if it did not favour the parties 
of the centre. In 1982, a new militant nationalist party with links to the IRA, Sinn Féin, 
appeared. Isolated from the other parties, Sinn Féin’s inability to capture preference votes in 
the early 1980s, particularly in local elections, has been seen as encouraging the party to 
moderate its stance, and to embrace the peace process (McGarry and O’Leary, 2006: 269). 
However, no such influences were evident at this time in respect of the Democratic Unionist 
Party, which opposed the 1998 Agreement until minor amendments were adopted in 2006. 
The five elections since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 have been critical to the debates 
about the ethnic implications of STV. In the initial election in 1998, some observers suggested 
that ‘STV did appear to play a modest but important vote-pooling role, allowing pro-
agreement votes to transfer across party and group lines to the advantage of non-sectarian 
middle parties’ (Reilly, 2001: 132, see also Evans and O’Leary, 2000: 79). Mitchell (2014: 
252-5) finds, on the basis of analysis of ‘terminal’ transfer patterns (votes transferred when no 
other candidate of the party whose votes are being passed on is available) that in 1998 there 
was increased cross-bloc vote pooling. This relies on a comparison with the 1982 election,  
one of several polarized elections at the height of the unrest, but it is also subject to a health 
warning: terminal transfers include ballots whose true ‘source’ may be impossible to discern 
from the published data, leading to ‘contamination’ or ‘pollution’ of the transfer data (see 
Gallagher 1978: 2). In any case, the 1998 pattern was not sustained at elections for 2003, 
2007, 2011 and 2016, which offer little evidence of cross-bloc vote pooling. 
The overall bias in Northern Ireland’s STV system can be more straightforwardly 
investigated, avoiding the thorny methodological questions of measuring terminal transfers, 
by examining overall variations in vote-seat shares. The Ulster Unionist Party’s 1998 seat-
vote advantage was largely at the expense of the centrist parties rather than the more radical 
Democratic Unionists (who also tended to obtain a seat share bonus). Neither of Northern 
Ireland’s nationalist parties had a similar seat-vote share advantage. Overall, the SDLP gained 
far more lower preferences from radical nationalists than it transferred to them over the period 
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1973-2011, though the position in the unionist camp was more mixed. Since the 1998 
agreement, the more radical parties—the militant nationalist Sinn Féin and the Democratic 
Unionist Party—were able to increase their first preference vote shares, and allocation of seats 
in the assembly. Growing support for the more radical parties may also be explained by the 
new rules regarding executive formation, which encouraged voters to back so-called ‘tribune 
parties’: Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionists appealed to nationalist and unionist voters 
for homogeneous support to avoid the First Minister’s position falling to the other group 
(Mitchell, Evans and O’Leary, 2009). 
Fiji 
The Pacific island state of Fiji, with a population of around 850,000, has long had political 
parties organised around the cleavage between indigenous Fijians (around 57% in 2007) and 
Fiji Indians (around 37%). After independence in 1970, election outcomes under single-
member plurality often exacerbated polarization. A military coup in May 1987 ousted a 
largely Indian-backed government, leaving the Fiji Indian community deeply alienated from 
the state. Yet, in 1997, a new constitution was agreed by ex-1987 coup leader turned reformist 
Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka and the major Fiji Indian opposition leader Jai Ram Reddy. 
Fiji replaced the plurality system by AV, to be used both in 46 communal constituencies (23 
reserved for ethnic Fijians, 19 for Fiji Indians, and four for others) and in 25 ‘open’ 
constituencies, where all Fiji’s citizens voted together. Ranking was compulsory. There was 
also a ticket voting option, enabling voters simply to tick the ballot paper in favour of a single 
party and so endorse that party’s preferences. The post-election process of government 
formation was to be constrained by use of a power-sharing formula, requiring all parties with 
10% of seats to be invited into cabinet. 
Fiji’s first AV election was held in 1999, and was characterized by the emergence of two 
broad multi-ethnic coalitions, each of which relied upon inter-party exchange of preference 
votes. The government that came into office after the 1999 election was led by Fiji’s first-ever 
Prime Minister of Indian descent, Mahendra Chaudhry, and drew its support largely from Fiji 
Indian voters. Chaudhry’s ‘People’s Coalition’ also included three small largely ethnic Fijian-
backed parties, each of which took ministerial portfolios. With 52 seats out of 71 in the new 
parliament, the ‘People’s Coalition’ seemed to have laid to rest the bitter polarization of the 
post-1987 coup years. 
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Closer analysis, however, suggested a different verdict. First, the parties defeated in 1999 
included those of the two leading architects of the new constitution and voting system, 
Rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), and Reddy’s National Federation Party. 
This had been the intended ‘government of the moderate middle’; Chaudhry’s platform had 
been to criticize the new constitutional arrangements as unfair to Indian voters and as a 
distraction from more pressing ‘bread and butter’ issues. The Labour Party had a multi-ethnic 
leadership and ideology, but its support base had become predominantly Fiji Indian. At the 
1999 election, the Labour Party obtained only 1.9% of the first preference ethnic Fijian vote. 
Its 37-seat majority in the 71-member house arose due to strategic use of the new AV system, 
drawing on advice from officials from the Australian Labor Party. Three small Fijian parties 
made tactical arrangements to try to oust Rabuka’s governing SVT party. Due to the ticket-
based ‘above-the-line’ voting system, which around 92-95% of voters used, party officials 
had acquired control of critical preference transfers, and delivered 14 marginal seats to the 
Labour Party. With its absolute majority, the Labour Party was not vulnerable to a ‘no 
confidence’ vote from these Fijian allies. All three allied parties took ministerial portfolios, 
but all had split within months, with rank-and-file dissidents challenging party leaders who 
clung to office. 
Exactly a year after the election, the Labour-led government was ousted in a coup by ethnic 
Fijian extremists. The coup instigators were eventually defeated and arrested by the Fiji 
military forces, but the Chaudhry government was not reinstated. Instead fresh elections in 
August 2001 reversed the 1999 result. A new predominantly ethnic Fijian-backed party, the 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), emerged with the largest number of seats, drawing 
on preferences from a grouping of centrist parties called the ‘moderates forum’. The SDL 
won 32 seats in the 71-member parliament, 14 dependent on party official-controlled 
preference transfers, and entered a coalition with a small hard-line ethnic Fijian party (the 
Conservative Alliance-Matanitu Vanua). In 2001, AV helped to obliterate the centrist parties, 
and assisted consolidation of a Fijian ethno-nationalist coalition. 
The new predominantly indigenous Fijian government survived a full but troubled five-year 
term, characterized by confrontations not only with the main Fiji Indian party, Chaudhry’s 
Labour Party, but also with military commander Frank Bainimarama, who was angered by the 
inclusion in cabinet of supporters of the 2000 coup. Fresh elections in May 2006 took place in 
a yet more polarised atmosphere. The major Fijian party, the SDL, obtained 80% of the 
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indigenous vote, while the main Fiji Indian party, the Labour Party, secured 81% of the Indian 
vote. Lower preferences decided outcomes in only nine cases. At 7.5%, disproportionality 
was less than in 1999 or 2001 (see Table 2), but this was largely because the vote share of the 
small moderate parties had collapsed. As in 2001, the major Fijian party, the SDL, emerged 
victorious with 36 seats to the Labour Party’s 31. This outcome was unacceptable to military 
commander Frank Bainimarama, who seized power in yet another coup in December 2006, 
and eventually abrogated the constitution. A key element in Bainimarama’s case for the coup 
was hostility to Fiji’s electoral system, in part because of its use of communal seats but also 
because of the AV system. A new constitution in 2013 replaced AV by open list proportional 
representation, and this system was used in 2014 elections which were won by Bainimarama’s 
FijiFirst Party (see Fraenkel 2015a). 
Papua New Guinea 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) has 7.7 million people speaking an estimated 840 languages. 
Political parties seldom articulate ‘ethnic’ divisions, distinguishing PNG from deeply divided 
settings such as Fiji, Northern Ireland, or Bosnia. In the run-up to independence in 1975, the 
Australian colonial authorities put in place an AV system with optional ranking that was used 
at three general elections, but then dropped it in favour of the plurality system. Reilly (2001: 
68, 86, 93) argued that AV fostered accommodation in 1964-72, whereas the shift to the 
plurality system ‘led to a very different kind of electoral competition, with little incentive for 
cross-ethnic voting and increasingly high levels of dummy candidature, vote splitting and 
electoral violence’, a change that undermined a ‘nascent party system that appeared to be 
developing under AV’. 
Yet the prevalence of vote-splitting and electoral violence and the weakness of PNG’s 
political parties can be explained by factors unrelated to the electoral system. It was the 
looming issue of independence that divided Michael Somare’s pro-independence Papua and 
Niugini Union Pati from the more conservative highlands-based United Party (May, 2006). 
Political parties remained mostly personalized vehicles for ambitious ‘big men’ with little 
ideological differentiation and negligible on-the-ground organizational machinery. Without 
robust parties, restraints on candidate proliferation were absent even under AV in 1968 and 
1972, and growth in candidate numbers continued inexorably thereafter under the plurality 
system. A substantial increase in the nomination fee in the early 1990s had little effect; in 
2002 there were on average 26 candidates per constituency. Vote splintering was not 
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necessarily along ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ lines, although in some parts of the country communal 
block voting did occur. Split candidacies within ‘clan’ groups were also frequent. Most 
importantly, the three initial AV elections occurred while PNG was still under colonial rule, 
when contests over parliamentary representation did not offer an avenue for control over the 
government.6 
The reintroduction of AV after the 2002 elections provided a stronger test of preferential 
voting than the pre-independence experiment. The new system, known locally as ‘limited 
preferential voting’, required voters to record preferences for at least three candidates. It was 
designed to raise victors’ average share of the vote, lower the number of candidates and 
reduce electoral violence (Reilly, 2001; 2002). Victors’ average vote shares on the final count 
were predictably higher under the new system, due to the elimination of the lowest polling 
candidates and aggregation of their ballots. The average victors’ vote share rose from 20.5% 
of valid ballots at the 2002 elections under the plurality system to around 33% in both 2007 
and 2012.7 Yet the earlier tendencies towards vote-splintering and candidate proliferation 
were still visible. In 2007, the number of candidates remained roughly the same as in 2002, 
but in 2012 it rose by 17% (to an average of 29.5 per constituency). Since so many candidates 
contest elections, all three voters’ choices are regularly eliminated prior to the final count. 
Around 40% of total ballots became exhausted in this way at the 2007 and 2012 elections. 
The impact of the reintroduction of AV on electoral violence is more difficult to assess. The 
revival of tribal fighting in the highlands after independence was connected with the end of 
the kiap system of colonial policing by foot patrol, not the shift in the electoral system (Ketan, 
2004: 60-61; Dinnen, 1998: 49; Standish 1978: 19; Strathern 1993: 44). Electoral violence 
intensified as a result of the proliferation of high-powered weaponry. Around 19 fatalities 
were reported in 2007 —lower than the 25 reported in 2002— but the figure was higher again 
for 2012. Neither the 2007 nor the 2012 outcome can be seen as entailing victory for a 
‘moderate’ party or coalition. PNG’s weakly institutionalized political parties are not 
organized around ethnic polarities in such a way as to identify any coalition as occupying ‘the 
centre’, thus limiting the relevance of findings from PNG for debates about the centrifugal or 
centripetal impact of preferential voting systems in divided societies. 
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Southern Rhodesia, Estonia, Sri Lanka and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
There are four further cases where preferential voting was used in legislative or presidential 
elections in divided societies, though for different reasons these offer strictly limited 
evidence. Two are to collective bodies: the 1958-65 parliamentary elections in Southern 
Rhodesia, and the last election of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia in 1990. Another two cases 
entailed elections to a single office: to the state presidency of Sri Lanka since 1978, and to the 
Serb presidency in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
An interesting finding emerges from a little known colonial experiment with AV in the self-
governing British territory of Southern Rhodesia, which in 1956 had a population of 2.5 
million (93% African). The Southern Rhodesian government extended the franchise in 1957 
to include a limited number of African voters (based on property and educational 
qualifications), leaving Europeans still comprising 86% of eligible voters, and introduced an 
optional AV system aimed at ensuring the election of white ‘moderates’. The incumbent 
centrist government, Sir Edgar Whitehead’s United Federal Party, won the 1958 election, 
despite obtaining fewer first preference votes than the conservative Dominion Party; it drew 
on transferred votes from a minor party, some of which must have come from African voters, 
for six of its 17 seats in the 30-member legislature (see Fraenkel 2015b). At the next election 
in 1962, it was unable to repeat that performance, primarily because of an African boycott. 
Instead, the Rhodesia Front obtained office, declared independence from the United Kingdom 
and – freed of restraints from London – dismantled electoral devices aimed at encouraging 
ethnic accommodation. Universal suffrage was conceded in 1979, resulting in the end of 
white minority rule, and the birth of the new state of Zimbabwe in 1980. The Southern 
Rhodesia experience, then, shows a marginalized group boycotting elections rather than 
backing the more ‘moderate’ of the dominant elite’s parties. 
In other cases, ethnic solidarity has trumped inter-communal vote transfers. In the final years 
before the re-establishment of its independence, Estonia (population 1.6 million) included a 
sizable Russian minority of 31%. Because of concerns that a majoritarian system would 
aggravate inter-ethnic tensions, STV was introduced for local elections in 1989. It was also 
used for what turned out to be the last election to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic in 1990, mostly in 3-member districts but with the Soviet army electing 
four of the 105 members (Taagepera, 1990). Available evidence suggests that voters restricted 
their preferences to their own ethnic bloc. As Rein Taagepera reported, ‘ethnicity overrode 
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other concerns in ranking of candidates’; Russian electors who voted for the liberal 
Democratic Party gave their second preferences ‘overwhelmingly to the reactionary 
imperialist Russian candidates rather than liberal but ethnically Estonian ones. Likewise, 
voters with Estonian first preferences continued with Estonian names’ (Taagepera, 1996: 31). 
In Sri Lanka (population just over 20 million), the dominant Sinhalese population (74% of the 
total) has been confronted by an active and militant ‘Ceylon Tamil’ minority of 13%, whose 
Tamil Tiger activists fought a military campaign against the government until their decisive 
defeat in 2009. The supplementary vote system was introduced in 1978 for presidential 
elections, enabling voters to indicate up to three preferences, a mechanism which could 
potentially encourage the Sinhalese parties to appeal to the Tamil population (Reilly, 2001: 
119). Yet there was little subsequent evidence of any centripetal shift among the Sinhalese 
parties. At all presidential elections between 1982 and 2015, the victor has always had an 
absolute majority of first preference votes, and lower preferences have therefore not been 
counted. Tamil electoral boycotts limit the usefulness of Sri Lanka as a test-case for 
preferential voting in divided societies (Horowitz, 1985; 1991; Reilly, 2001). Yet non-
participation is itself a verdict of sorts: as was the case with Africans in Southern Rhodesia in 
1958 and 1962, Tamils mostly chose to abstain rather than give support to any of the 
Sinhalese candidates. When Tamils did participate in presidential elections in 2015, most of 
their first preference votes were cast not for a Tamil candidate but for the opposition 
candidate Maithripala Sirisena, with a view to ousting the incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa, 
whose government was held responsible for the plight of the Tamils. 
As in Estonia, the political turmoil associated with the demise of communist government led 
to the creation of a deeply divided state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The population of 4.4 million 
in 1991 was divided between Bosniaks (44%), Serbs (31%) and Croats (17%), but the 1995 
Dayton Peace Accord resulted in the creation of a loose federation linking two entities: an 
overwhelmingly Serbian Republika Srpska, and a Bosniak-Croat federation. Initial post-
Dayton triumph of the wartime nationalist parties in elections held in 1996 and 1997 kicked 
off a period of experimentation in electoral law. In the Republika Srpska, provision was made 
for the use of AV in the presidential election of 2000 to assist moderate candidates favoured 
by the intervening powers over ultra-nationalist candidates (Bose, 2002: 231; Belloni, 2004: 
342; Manning & Antić, 2003). The strategy failed: Serb voters adopted a harder line in the 
AV presidential elections than in the simultaneous parliamentary elections. This popularity of 
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the Serb Democratic Party reflected Serb suspicion of international efforts to promote a more 
‘moderate’ candidate. Thus, ‘the deployment of an AV system actually precipitated a much 
higher degree of consolidation of the ethnic Serb electorate behind the [Serb Democratic 
Party], an “extremist” party in the standard international (particularly American) view, than 
might otherwise have been the case’ (Bose, 2002: 232; Belloni, 2007: 83). 
The strongly nationalist Serb Democratic Party’s presidential ticket obtained 49.8% of first 
preference votes, and crossed the 50% threshold at the first distribution of lower preferences. 
That first redistribution covered ballots of those who supported the small Bosnian Party 
(supported mainly by the absentee Bosniak minority): 70% of these recorded a second 
preference, and of these 97% backed other Bosniak parties, with only 2% transferring to the 
‘moderate’ Serb ticket (Bose, 2002: 233). As in other highly polarized settings under optional 
preferential voting, the minority community preferred to exhaust ballots rather than 
transferring these to a ‘moderate’ alternative in the majority community. 
CONCLUSION 
Around the turn of the century, experiments in two settings encouraged support for the 
‘centripetalist’ perspective regarding preferential voting, but viewed over the longer run this 
verdict merits reappraisal. In Northern Ireland in 1998 the moderate SDLP and the Ulster 
Unionist Party fared reasonably well in an STV election, and benefitted from vote transfers. 
The following year, an election in Fiji using an AV system saw an inter-ethnic coalition 
emerge victorious, and ushered in the first ever Prime Minister from the Fiji Indian minority. 
Yet in Northern Ireland the expected ‘coalition of the moderate middle’ did not ultimately 
triumph. Instead the power-sharing arrangement came eventually to be dominated by the 
more radical parties. Electoral outcomes in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2016 indicate a more 
centrifugal pattern than 1998, though the previously ‘radical’ parties moderated their 
objectives, and in 2016 the ‘moderate’ parties went into opposition, leaving government to 
their militant rivals. In Fiji, there was a coup only a year after the first AV election, followed 
by two highly polarized AV elections and then a military takeover. After the third coup in 
2006, moderate politicians, frustrated by the failure of the AV electoral experiment, embraced 
military rule in the hope that this would prove a more effective way of resolving ethnic 
antagonisms. 
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We have examined above all cases of preferential voting systems used for national 
legislatures, as well as the two cases of its use in direct presidential elections, in ethnically 
diverse societies. We found that appreciation of the character of underlying ethnic divisions 
was critical to analysis of the pattern of transfers. We detect three patterns: hegemony, 
balance and fragmentation. First, where one group forms the vast majority, as in Sri Lanka, 
Estonia and the Republika Srpska, divisions among dominant group parties may in principle 
make minority group preference transfers decisive for victory. Yet, in the cases we surveyed, 
there was little sign of any of the dominant group parties framing their political platforms to 
secure minority preferences. Nor were minorities, in such settings, likely to assist in 
delivering victory to a ‘moderate’ majority party. Second, when the two groups are of roughly 
even size, as in Fiji and Northern Ireland, the level of ethnic bloc solidarity also tends to be 
high, unless other mechanisms intervene to promote inter-communal power-sharing. Third, 
where the degree of ethno-linguistic fragmentation is high and where a robust party system is 
lacking, as in Papua New Guinea, preferential voting may promote local-level ballot transfers, 
but since there is no nation-wide ethnic cleavage structuring the party system this does not 
promote ‘moderate’ candidates or parties. 
As regards institutional arrangements, three important dimensions of preferential voting are of 
critical significance. 
• Constituency size: STV’s capacity to achieve a reasonable degree of proportionality, 
particularly where district size is high, prevents substantial seat bonuses for any party, or 
communal bloc, whether moderate or not; AV is much more likely to deliver significant 
seat-vote divergences. 
• Ranking: mandatory ranking encourages preference votes to transfer across blocs, but it 
also generates the possibility that intermediate preferences will be deliberately 
squandered on no-hope candidates; with optional ranking, first count leaders are rarely 
dislodged, as studies of outcomes in the Canadian provinces and Irish by-elections have 
shown (Jansen, 2004; Punnett, 1987). 
• Ticket voting: in preferential voting systems this offers a powerful strategic instrument to 
party elites, as in Fiji in 1999, where it assisted an inter-ethnic coalition of ‘outs’ in 
defeating a moderate coalition of ‘ins’ (Fraenkel and Grofman 2006a); without ticket 
voting, ranking would have been more strongly along ethnic lines.8 
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In theory, transfers under preferential voting systems might promote ‘moderation’ in at least 
three distinct ways. They might give an advantage to centrist parties; favour moderates over 
radicals in the respective ethnic camps; or traverse inter-communal divisions. 
In bicommunal settings, centrist parties might expect to receive ballot transfers when parties 
representing one or other communal group are eliminated. But this requires such parties to 
have critical mass: in none of the cases we surveyed, aside from Southern Rhodesia in 1958, 
did a centrist party have sufficient first preference support to gain significantly in this way. 
Fiji’s centrist parties fared poorly at all three AV elections, and their defeat encouraged those 
seeking to bridge the ethnic divide to look to military rule as a solution. Northern Ireland’s 
Alliance Party has kept its seat share close to its first preference vote share, but never gained 
major advantages from STV; aggregate transfers from centrists to communally identified 
parties tend to be much higher than those from the nationalist or unionist parties to the centre. 
Evidence of transfers within communal groups towards more moderate parties is stronger. 
Logically, where communal politics dominates voting loyalties and where ranking continues 
outside communal blocs, elimination of flank parties is likely to generate transfers towards the 
more moderate parties within the same communal camp. Yet much depends on the respective 
size of the blocs, and the pattern of party allegiances. Where transfers within communal blocs 
do favour the more moderate alternatives, this does not necessarily confirm claims of 
preferential voting imparting a ‘centripetal spin’ to electoral politics. Both STV and AV 
enable voters to rank radical or other minority parties first, even where they have little chance 
of winning. Had electoral systems based on categorical choice been in place, it is likely that at 
least some of these voters would have indicated primary allegiance for the more ‘realistic’ 
mainstream or moderate party identified with their own communal group. 
There is little evidence of sizable inter-communal transfers, particularly in contexts where the 
ranking of preferences is optional, as in Northern Ireland. In Southern Rhodesia and Sri Lanka 
marginalized communities boycotted the polls. In Fiji, under compulsory ranking, there were 
significant inter-communal transfers, but these were encouraged by the party ticket option on 
the ballot paper, which enabled the parties to control vote transfers and use inter-ethnic 
alliances for strategic purposes. 
We have shown in this article that preferential voting systems vary in their manipulative 
propensity which increases with single-member districts, compulsory ranking and ticket 
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voting. With STV, particularly where used with large district magnitudes, a propensity to 
deliver close seat-vote proportionality sets limits on the system’s capacity to encourage any 
particular bloc or political party, whether moderate or not. With AV, seat-vote 
disproportionality may be high, generating scope for much more sizable seat-vote share 
advantages. Instead of asking, then, whether or not these electoral systems ‘favour 
moderation’, we should first ask whether they are accompanied by arrangements that permit 
pulling seat-vote proportionality away from zero, and only thereafter ask whether or not this 
favours radical or moderate parties, or big as against small parties, or regionally concentrated 
as against dispersed parties. As a formula for the pursuit of peace in divided societies, STV 
may be more likely to yield minority representation than AV, but neither system in and of 
itself promotes cross-bloc electoral collaboration. In both Northern Ireland and Fiji, those 
seeking to encourage compromise across blocs have therefore had to look to other 
mechanisms, such as mandatory power-sharing. 
REFERENCES 
ARK (2016) Northern Ireland Election Results. www.ark.ac.uk/elections/ 
Barkan, Joel (1995) ‘Elections in agrarian societies’, Journal of Democracy 6 (4): 106-116. 
Belloni, Roberto (2004) ‘Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, International Peacekeeping 11 (2): 334-353 
Belloni, Roberto (2007) State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia (London & New 
York, Routledge) 
Bose, Sumantra (2002) Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Chandra, Kanchan (2005) ‘Ethnic parties and democratic stability’, Perspectives on Politics 3 (2): 
235-252. 
Coakley, John (2009) ‘The political consequences of the electoral system in Northern Ireland’, Irish 
Political Studies 24 (3): 253-284 
Dinnen, Sinclair (1998) ‘Weakness and strength—state, society and order in Papua New Guinea, in P 
Dauvergne (ed,), Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies (London: Allen and Unwin): 
38-59 
Elliott, Sydney (1973) Northern Ireland Parliamentary Election Results 1921-1972 (Chichester: 
Political Reference Publications) 
Elliott, Sydney, and Richard A Wilford (1983) The 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly Election 
(Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde) 
Endersby, James W, and Michael J. Towle (2014) ‘Making wasted votes count: turnout, transfers, and 
preferential voting in practice’, Electoral Studies 33 (1): 144-52 
Evans, Geoffrey and O’Leary, Brendan (2000) ‘Northern Irish voters and the British-Irish Agreement: 
foundations of a stable consociational settlement?’, Political Quarterly 71 (1): 78-101 
Fiji Elections Office (1999). Elections ‘99: Results by the count (Suva: Government Printer) 
Fiji Elections Office (2001). General Elections 2001: Results by the Count (Suva: Government 
Printer) 
Fiji Elections Office (2006) Election Results by the Count, 2006 (Suva: Government Printer) 
Fraenkel, Jon (2001) ‘The alternative vote system in Fiji: electoral engineering or ballot-rigging?’, 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 39 (1): 1-31 
Ethnic implications of referential voting p. 21 
Fraenkel, Jon (2015a) ‘The Remorseless Power of Incumbency in Fiji’s September 2014 Election’, 
The Round Table 104 (2): 151-164 
Fraenkel, Jon (2015b) ‘“Equal Rights for Every Civilized Man South of the Zambesi”: Electoral 
Engineering in Southern Rhodesia 1957-65’, Journal of Southern African Studies 41 (6): 1167-
1180 
Fraenkel, Jon, and Bernard Grofman (2004) ‘A neo-Downsian model of the alternative vote as a 
mechanism for mitigating ethnic conflict in plural societies’, Public choice 121 (3-4): 487-506 
Fraenkel, Jon, and Bernard Grofman (2006a) ‘Does the alternative vote foster moderation in ethnically 
divided societies? The case of Fiji’, Comparative Political Studies 39 (5): 623-651 
Fraenkel, Jon, and Bernard Grofman (2006b) ‘The failure of the alternative vote as a tool for ethnic 
moderation in Fiji: a rejoinder to Horowitz’, Comparative Political Studies 39 (5): 663-666 
Fraenkel, Jon, and Bernard Grofman (2007) ‘The merits of neo-Downsian modelling of the alternative 
vote: a reply to Horowitz’, Public Choice 133 (1-2): 1-11 
Fraenkel, Jon, and Bernard Grofman (2014) The Borda Count and its Real World Alternatives: 
Comparing Scoring Rules in Nauru and Slovenia, Australian Journal of Political Science 49 
(2): 186-205 
Gallagher, Michael (1978) “Party Solidarity, Exclusivity and Inter-Party Relationships in Ireland, 
1922-1977: the evidence of transfers”, Economic and Social Review 10 (1): 1-22 
Guelke, Adrian (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge: Polity) 
Hirczy de Miño, Wolfgang, and Lane, Jan-Erik (1996) ‘STV in Malta: some surprises’, 
Representation 34 (1): 21-28 
Horowitz, Donald L (1985) Ethnic groups in conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press) 
Horowitz, Donald L (1989) Incentives and Behaviour in the Ethnic Politics of Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia’, Third World Quarterly 10 (4): 18-35 
Horowitz, Donald L (1991) A democratic South Africa? Constitutional engineering in a divided 
society (Berkeley: University of California Press) 
Horowitz, Donald L (2001) ‘The Northern Ireland agreement: clear, consociational and risky’, pp. 
109-136 in John McGarry, ed., Northern Ireland and the divided world: post-agreement 
Northern Ireland in comparative perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Horowitz, Donald L (2002a) ‘Constitutional design: proposals versus processes’, pp. 15-36 in Andrew 
Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, 
and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Horowitz, Donald L (2002b) ‘Explaining the Northern Ireland agreement: the sources of an unlikely 
constitutional consensus’, British Journal of Political Science 32 (2): 193-220 
Horowitz, Donald L (2004) ‘The alternative vote and ethnic moderation: a reply to Fraenkel and 
Grofman’, Public Choice 121 (3-4): 507-516 
Horowitz, Donald L (2006) ‘Strategy takes a holiday: Fraenkel and Grofman on the alternative vote’, 
Comparative Political Studies 39 (5): 652-662 
ICG (International Crisis Group) (1998) ‘Changing the logic of Bosnian politics’, ICG Discussion 
paper on electoral reform, March 10 
Jansen, Harold (2004) ‘The Political Consequences of the Alternative Vote: Lessons from Western 
Canada’, Canadian Journal of Political Science 37 (3): 647-669 
Ketan, Joseph (2004) The Name Must not go Down; political competition and state-society relations 
in Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea (Suva, Institute of Pacific Studies, USP) 
Lakeman, Enid (1955) Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral 
Systems (London: Faber) 
Laponce, Jean (1957) ‘The protection of minorities by the electoral system’, Western Political 
Quarterly 10 (2): 318-39 
Lardeyret, Guy (1991) ‘The problem with PR’, Journal of Democracy 2: 30-35 
Lawrence, RJ, S Elliott and MJ Laver (1975) The Northern Ireland General Elections of 1973. Cmnd. 
5851 (London: HMSO) 
Lijphart, Arend (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale 
University Press) 
Lijphart, Arend (1985) Power-Sharing in South Africa, Policy Papers in International Affairs, 24, 
(Berkeley, Institute of International Studies) 
Ethnic implications of referential voting p. 22 
Lijphart, Arend (1991) ‘The alternative vote: a realistic alternative for South Africa?’, Politikon 18 
(2): 91-101 
Mackenzie, WJM (1954) ‘Representation in plural societies’, Political studies 2 (1): 54-69 
Manning, C & Miljenko Antić (2003) ‘Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: the limits of electoral 
engineering’, Journal of Democracy 14 (3): pp 45-59 
Mansergh, Nicholas (1936) The Government of Northern Ireland: A Study in Devolution (London: 
George Allen and Unwin) 
May, Ron (2006) ‘Political parties in Papua New Guinea’, pp. 83-102 in Rich, Roland, Hambly, L., 
and Morgan, M (eds) Political Parties in the Pacific Islands (Canberra: Pandanus) 
May, Ron. J, Wheen, Katherine and Haley, Nicole (2011) ‘Assessing the shift to limited preferential 
voting’, in May, Ron. M, Anere, Ray, Haley, Nicole, and Wheen, Katherine., eds, Election 
2007: The Shift to Limited Preferential Voting in Papua New Guinea, National Research 
Institute (PNG) and State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, Australian National 
University. 
McAllister, Ian (1975) The 1975 Northern Ireland Convention election (Glasgow: Survey Research 
Centre, University of Strathclyde) [Occasional paper no. 14] 
McGarry, John and Brendan O’Leary (2006) ‘Consociational theory, Northern Ireland’s conflict, and 
its agreement. Part 2. What critics of consociationalism can learn from Northern Ireland’, 
Government and Opposition 41 (2): 249-277 
McGarry, John and Brendan O’Leary (2009) ‘Power shared after the deaths of thousands’, pp. 15-84 
in Rupert Taylor, ed., Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland 
conflict (London: Routledge) 
Mietzner, Marcus (2008) ‘Comparing Indonesia’s party systems of the 1950s and the post-Suharto era: 
From centrifugal to centripetal inter-party competition’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39: 
431-453 
Mitchell, Paul (2014) ‘The single transferable vote and ethnic conflict: the evidence from Northern 
Ireland’, 1982-2007, Electoral Studies 33 (1): 246-57 
Mitchell, Paul, Geoffrey Evans and Brendan O’Leary (2009) ‘Extremist outbidding in ethnic party 
systems is not inevitable: tribune parties in Northern Ireland’, Political Studies 57: 397-421 
Palley, Claire (1978) Constitutional Law and Minorities (London: Minority Rights Group) [Report no. 
36] 
Papua New Guinea Electoral Office 1973. Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on the 1972 House of 
Assembly General Election (Port Moresby: Government Printer) 
Passmore, GC & Mitchell, M.T., (1963) Sourcebook of Parliamentary Elections and Referenda in 
Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1962, Dept of Government, University College of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. 
Punnett, R.M. (1987) ‘The alternative vote with optional use of preferences: Some Irish lessons for 
Britain and Australia’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 25 (1): 26-43 
Reilly, Benjamin (2001) Democracy in Divided Societies; Electoral Engineering for Conflict 
Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Reilly, Benjamin (2002) ‘Back to the future? The political consequences of electoral reform in Papua 
New Guinea’, Journal of Pacific History 37 (2): 239-53 
Reilly, Benjamin and Andrew Reynolds (2000) Electoral systems and conflict in divided societies 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press) 
Reynolds, Andrew (1995) ‘Constitutional engineering in South Africa’, Journal of Democracy 6 (1): 
86-99 
Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly and Andrew Ellis, with others (2006) Electoral System Design: The 
New International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance) 
Salamey, Imad & Pearson, Frederic. (2005) ‘The Crisis of Federalism and Electoral Strategies in Iraq’, 
International Studies Perspectives 6: 190-207. 
Sartori, G. (1968) ‘Political Development and Political Engineering’, in J.D. Montgomery and A.O. 
Hirschman (eds), Public Policy, Vol. 17 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press): 261-298 
Sharman, Campbell, Sayers, A.M. Miragliotta, N (2002) ‘Trading party preferences: the Australian 
experience of preferential voting’, Electoral Studies 21 (4): 543-560 
Ethnic implications of referential voting p. 23 
Standish, Bill (1978) ‘The ‘Big Man’ model reconsidered: power and stratification in Chimbu’, 
Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper, 22, Boroko, Papua New 
Guinea, 1-43 
Stone, David (1976) ‘The Political Turning Point: The Birth of the National Coalition Government’, in 
David Stone, ed., Prelude to Self-Government: Electoral Politics in Papua New Guinea 1972 
(Canberra: ANU): 529-538 
Strathern, Andrew (1993) ‘Violence and political change in Papua New Guinea’, Pacific Studies 16 
(4): 41-60. 
Taagepera, Rein (1990) ‘The Baltic States’, Electoral Studies 9 (4): 303-11 
Taagepera, Rein (1996) ‘STV in transitional Estonia’, Representation 34 (1): 29-36 
Territory of Papua and New Guinea (1964) Statistical Returns Showing the Voting within each Open 
and Special Electorate in Relation to the General Election for the House of Assembly (Port 
Moresby: Government Printer) 
Territory of Papua and New Guinea, (1968) Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on the House of 
Assembly Election, 1968 (Port Moresby: Government Printer) 
Wilford, Rick (2010) ‘Northern Ireland: the politics of constraint’, Parliamentary Affairs 63 (1): 134-
55 
Wimmer, Andreas (2003-4) ‘Democracy and ethno-religious conflict in Iraq’, Survival 45 (4): 111-34 
Ethnic implications of referential voting p. 24 
Table 1. Trade-offs in Susceptibility to Manipulation of Preferential Voting Systems 
 
 Susceptibility to Manipulation 
 High Low 
 
District magnitude: Low High  
Ballot ranking: Compulsory Optional  
Ticket voting: Yes  No 
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Table 2. Legislative Elections in Ethnically Divided Societies under Preferential Voting Systems 
 
Country/system/  Seats in  Average  Dispro-   Effective 
year legislature  district portionality number of 
   magnitude  index  parties 
 
Northern Ireland (STV, optional ranking) 
1921 *48 5.3 8.1 1.7 
1925 *48 5.3 3.6 2.5 
 
1973 78 6.5 5.6 5.2 
1975  78 6.5 4.2 5.6 
1982 78 6.5 5.4 4.2 
 
1998 108 6 3.5 5.4 
2003 108 6 2.8 4.5 
2007 108 6 3.2 4.3 
2011 108 6 4.2 4.2 
2016 108 6 5.2 4.3 
 
Fiji (AV, mandatory ranking) 
1999 71 1 19.5 3.1 
2001 71 1 15.8 2.8 
2006 71 1 7.5 2.2 
 
PNG (AV, optional ranking) 
1964 54 1 N/A N/A 
1968 78 1 N/A N/A 
1972 100 1 N/A 5.3 
 
PNG (AV, mandatory ranking) 
2007 109 1 N/A 12.2 
2012 111 1 N/A 10.9 
 
Southern Rhodesia (AV, optional ranking) 
1958 30 1 13.2 2.0 
1962 65 1 1.4 2.0 
1965 65 1 4.4 1.6 
 
Estonia (STV, optional ranking) 
1990 105 2.3 N/A N/A 
 
Sources: Computed from Elliott (1973), ARK (2016), Fiji Elections Office (1999, 2001, 2006), Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea (1964, 1968), Papua New Guinea Electoral Office (1973), May (2006: 85), Stone (1976: 
536), unpublished electoral data for PNG for 2007 and 2012, Taagepera (1990: 304), Passmore & Mitchell 
(1963), Rhodesia Herald (10 May 1965). 
 
Notes: *Not including university seats. 
AV = alternative vote, STV = single transferable vote, N/A = not applicable.  
For disproportionality calculation, vote tallies relate to contested constituencies only; uncontested seats included 
in seat tallies. Indices are sensitive to the method of grouping of small parties and independents as ‘others’ 
(particularly as regards rival wings of the Unionist Party in the early 1970s); the data here should be seen as 
indicating order of magnitude only. 
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NOTES 
  
1. This paper focuses on the use of preferential voting in divided societies. On occasion we use the 
term ‘diverse societies’ so as to include also Papua New Guinea (PNG), which has figured 
prominently in the literature but which is not a ‘divided society’ in Guelke’s (2012: 30) sense, 
where ‘conflict exists along a well-entrenched fault line that is recurrent and endemic and that 
contains the potential for violence between the segments’. PNG’s citizens do not vote along 
‘ethnic lines’, and it does not have political parties organized along any ethnic cleavage. 
2. Tasmania uses AV for its upper house, and STV for its lower house. The Northern Territory 
Legislative Assembly, a federally administered territory, also uses AV. 
3. In March 2016, reforms to electoral rules for the Australian Senate allowed optional preferential 
voting ‘above the line’ in an effort to diminish strategic manipulation of transfers by minor 
candidates.  
4. Even without ticket voting, ballot paper layout may also have an impact, for example if 
candidates are grouped by party as in Malta (Hirczy de Miño and Lane, 1996: 23) or solely 
listed by name without party affiliations as in Estonia (Taagepera, 1996). 
5. Simulation of 1973-2007 election results in Northern Ireland under the AV system suggests that 
while it would initially have greatly assisted the more moderate of the two parties in either bloc, 
the centre, represented by the Alliance Party, would have been virtually obliterated (Coakley, 
2009). 
6. After the 1972 election, PNG became self-governing, ahead of independence in 1975. 
7. This is based on available data for 102 of the 109 constituencies in 2007 (May et al, 2011: 184) 
and 107 of 111 electorates in 2012.  
8. In Australia, party control over preference ranking has been exerted both via ‘how to vote’ cards 
and ticket voting. One study found that this control had been used for a wide range of purposes, 
including ‘hostile’, ‘punishing’, and ‘discriminatory’ purposes, as well as for purposes of 
‘coalition maintenance’, acquiring ‘policy influence’ and expressing ‘ideological similarity’ 
(Sharman et al, 2002: 548). 
